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BOOK REVIEWS
PRACTICING COMMUNITY
REBELLIOUS LAWYERING:

ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE

LAW PRACTICE. By Gerald P. L6pez.
1992. Pp. ix, 433. $55.00, $17.95.

1 Boulder: Westview Press, Inc.

2
Reviewed by Anthony V. Alfieri

"Yeah," he said, "we used to call it nigger removal." Pretending
not to hear, I looked away to the soot-coated New England church
where the night meeting had just ended. People milled around on
the sidewalk, some stepping into the street. They talked about crime
and housing. They wanted more police, better housing, cleaner
streets.
This was my first meeting. My job was to organize community
education and outreach programs for the housing unit of the local
legal services office. The community was multi-ethnic, multi-racial,
and poor. Waves of immigrants - Irish, Southern black, Portuguese,
Laotian - had left their mark on storefronts, streets, and homes.
Sometimes new storeowners never bothered to take down an old sign:
a Chinese restaurant housed in a former gas station still bore the name
of the station in tall black letters painted over the front door.
Some homeowners also left untended the ramshackle repairs of
previous owners. Their houses stood crooked and stooped on small
cement or tar-covered lots, many with surrounding chainlink fences.
Most had little time or money for renovation; they were either too
busy with jobs and children or too old and impoverished. After a
few months of walking house-to-house and knocking door-to-door, I
developed an aesthetic of urban displacement that helped me to learn
the history of a block, a store, or a home by surveying its outward
signs of decay and renewal.
"Yeah," he said, "in the sixties they called it urban renewal. They
kick you out of your house, move you away from your neighborhood,
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and put you up in a high-rise where you don't know anybody." I
didn't know the man's name. We had happened to walk out of the
meeting together. In the dim street light, I could see only a short and
thickset black figure. From his closely cropped hair with scattered
patches of gray, I guessed he was in his fifties, though poor people
often look older.
I asked him what he thought of the meeting. He asked me what
I was doing there. I explained that I worked for a legal services
program coordinating community outreach. He smiled. I asked him
about the problems in the community. He laughed. I asked him
whether he wanted to help organize a community, block, or tenants'
association to improve the neighborhood. "Urban renewal," he said,
"nigger removal." Then he turned and walked away.
Some years later, I worked for a legal services office in a Lower
East Side neighborhood of New York City. Like the New England
community I came to know, the neighborhood had been swept by
periodic but distinct swells of immigration: Italian, then Jewish, and
later, Puerto Rican. One summer night, a senior legal services attorney and I attended a meeting called by a local community group
trying to rehabilitate abandoned buildings. The meeting took place
in a vacant storefront on a side street. The organizers had closed all
the windows and doors to keep out the street noise. There was no
air-conditioning.
When we walked in, one of the community organizers, a young
Puerto Rican woman, quickly spotted our suits and ties and seated
us. The storefront had been emptied and the walls razed, leaving a
large, unevenly painted room with steel and plastic chairs arranged
in a big circle in the middle of the floor. Just before the meeting
began, an older black woman seated nearby stood up, walked to a
table where several pitchers of water stood, poured out two cups,
walked back, bent over, and, without a word, handed them to us.
They were the last two cups on the table.
What do the acts of subordinated people 3 toward progressive
lawyers4 signify? What does it mean to walk away from a lawyer or
to offer him a cup of water? Is the meaning tied to a local setting or
does it extend to a wider, universal context? Is it influenced by class,
ethnicity, gender, race, or power? Is it discoverable or knowable?
I believe that we can partially decipher the meaning of people's
acts, contingent on the epistemic, interpretive, and linguistic stance
of both participants in and observers of those acts. Lawyers are both
3 I employ the term "subordinated people" to describe individuals - here poor people of
color - who inhabit the bottom of political, social, and economic hierarchies for reasons of age,
class, disability, ethnicity, gender, race, or sexual orientation.
4 1 use the term "progressive lawyers" broadly to encompass civil rights, legal services, and
public interest lawyers.
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participants and observers; their acts of knowing, interpreting, reading, writing, and speaking construct as well as witness the construction of meaning. Law inscribes fragments of this constructed meaning
into its oral, written, and social texts, which in turn shape the roles
and relations of lawyers, clients, and institutional decisionmakers.
Out of these roles and relations community sometimes comes.
My encounters with poor people in New England and New York
City signify for me the loss and redemption of community. Like many
progressive lawyers, I have long searched for community among people who look upon me as an outsider. By community, I do not mean
a collection of individuals united by a shared class, gender, or race,
but rather, a congregation of different individuals drawn together by
a commitment to particular legal rights and political entitlements. The
congregation may be large or small. The commitments may be abstract
(economic justice) or concrete (the right to shelter).5 Neither the size
of the congregation nor the object of the commitment is of great
consequence. What matters is the recognition and the appreciation of
difference. Communities forged from difference bridge the epistemic,
interpretive, and linguistic boundaries that prevent individuals from
collaborating to achieve common goals. Cast as outsiders, lawyers
stand at the borders of these communities, their entry impeded by
difference.
Differences in knowledge and education, cognition and interpretation, language and symbol all erect boundaries. 6 Some boundaries
are visible in the trappings of lawyer dress (suit and briefcase); others
resonate in the content of lawyer speech (substantive rights and procedural rules). Additionally, the knowledge structures, cognitive
frameworks, and interpretive practices of lawyers establish boundaries
through certain conceptions of clients (dependent, inferior, passive),
through spatial relations (gesture, posture, seating), and through patterns of speech (formal, monologic).
Boundaries of difference crisscrossed the neighborhood meetings I
attended in New England and New York City. They cut across class,
education, gender, language, and race. For me, this cleavage produced both loss and redemption. Community is lost when people
assume that difference precludes understanding. By contrast, community is redeemed when people believe that difference provokes understanding, even if that understanding is difficult to reach and only
partial in scope.
S In organizing community education and outreach programs, I collaborated with people
who expressed both abstract and concrete forms of normative commitment. Some participated
in program activities out of religious conviction, motivated by a spiritual sense of community
service. Others collaborated to fix problems - for example, to remove the crumbling chimney
of a dilapidated house located across the street from a school playground.
6 See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, ExCLUSION, AND
AMERIcAN LAW 49-78 (iggo) (examining the unstated assumptions of difference dilemmas).
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The man who turned his back on me and walked away rejected
the chance of community. He had good historical reason. I am a
white, male lawyer - an outsider. For twenty or more years, he has
witnessed people who look and sound a lot like me march unsummoned into his neighborhood to fix problems, to "do good." He has
watched them bulldoze his home, fracture his neighborhood, and
segregate his housing. He has seen people like me come and go. Not
surprisingly, he may distrust me; indeed, he seems implicitly to hold
me responsible for the errors and ephemeral convictions of forgotten
advocates. With no chance for understanding between us, he repudiates my romantic bid to "save" him.
The woman who offered me a cup of water may be no different.
She too may hold me in contempt for the arrogant and wrongheaded
acts of my predecessors. She, however, may be more politic. She
might seek to evoke sympathy in me for the cause of her community
group, or she might want to court favor in the event she needs to
retain me some day. Perhaps she is acting out the ritualistic flattery
and servility expected of the poor when in the company of "helping"
professionals. More simply, she might have seen us sweating in our
suits and ties, and thought us to be thirsty.
Whatever her intent, the woman won our gratitude and notice.
That human connection created the opportunity, decidedly narrow
and perhaps illusory, for the redemption of community. Every meeting between progressive lawyers and subordinated people affords the
opportunity to redeem community in small moments of human connection and in large events of group mobilization. The humanist faith
7
that guides progressive advocacy embraces that opportunity.
In Rebellious Lawyering: One Chicano's Vision of Progressive Law
Practice, Gerald L6pez undertakes a penetrating analysis of progressive lawyering practiced on behalf of subordinated people in impoverished communities. Not since the 1978 publication of Gary Bellow
8
and Bea Moulton's groundbreaking work, The Lawyering Process,
has a book presented such a thorough critique and so bold a vision
of progressive lawyering in the fields of civil rights and poverty law.
Notwithstanding L6pez's aspirational vision, I harbor little faith
in the ability of progressive lawyers to redeem community in their
individual and collective meetings with subordinated clients. All too
often, lawyers exploit these valuable encounters to advance personal

7 Lucie White echoes this faith in her work. See Lucie E. White, Seeking ". . . the Faces
": A Response to ProfessorsSarat, Felstiner, and Cahn, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
1499, 1511 (1992) ("We must seek, in our encounters with others, not just to map the power or

of Otherness . . .

read the text, but also to recognize, in all its alterity, the other's face.").
8 GARY BELLOW & BEA MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL
INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY (1978).
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moral and political agendas. In carrying out their own agendas,
progressive lawyers give too little and take too much.
What do progressive lawyers give to subordinated people? The
conventional answer is rights. 9 Lawyers give people their legal rights.
The logical correlate of rights is power, for judicially enforced rights
constitute power. On this reasoning, giving people their rights is
empowering. 10
What do progressive lawyers take from subordinated people? The
answer is dignity: the value of independent action and speech." Lawyers take people's dignity. The taking deprives them of the opportunity to demonstrate - in private and public spheres - their competence as autonomous, self-determining agents. That deprivation

denies people a vital component of their personhood (self-esteem and
self-sufficiency) and denies communities a crucial element of their
solidarity (organization and mobilization).
How do we explain the give and take of progressive lawyering?
Some turn to theory and winnow insights from the writings of critical
race, 12 feminist,13 and critical legal studies 14 scholars. Others sift for
connections in the interdisciplinary literature of the humanities 5 and
9 On the prevalence of rights discourse in progressive traditions of advocacy, see STUART
SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE
passim (1974).

10 In an earlier work, I asserted a strong belief in rights-based empowerment. See Anthony
V. Alfieri, The Antinomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 659, 695-711 (1988). I am no longer confident of that belief.
" On the denial of client dignity in lawyer advocacy and legal procedure, see Lucie E.
White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of
Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. I, 52-58 (1990).
12Critical race scholars have lagged in their analysis of practice. For recent applications,
see Angelo N. Ancheta, Community Lawyering, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1363, 1383-88 (I993) (reviewing GERALD P. L6PEZ, REBELLIOUS LAVYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE

LA-%V PRACTICE (1992)); Margaret M. Russell, Entering Great America: Reflections on Race and
the Convergence of Progressive Legal Theory and Practice, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 749, 759-67
(1992); Michelle Jacobs, People from the Footnotes: The Missing Element in Client Centered
Counseling (Nov. 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
'3 Feminist scholars have flourished in their blending of theory and practice. For notable
examples, see Marie Ashe, "Bad Mothers," "Good Lawyers," and "Legal Ethics," 81 GEo. L.J.
2533, 2546-60 (1993); Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and
Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1599, 1625-67 (i99i); Lucie E. White, No Exit: Rethinking "Welfare Dependency"from a Different Ground, 81 GEO. L.J. i96i, 1971-90 (1993).

14Because critical legal studies (cls) scholars have neglected the analysis of practice, the task
of combining theory and practice has been left to sympathetic observers. See, e.g., Anthony V.
Alfieri, Disabled Clients, Disabling Lawyers, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 769, 778-94 (1992); Phyllis
Goldfarb, Beyond Cut Flowers: Developing a Clinical Perspective on CriticalLegal Theory, 43
HASTINGS L.J. 717, 727-39 (1992).
15 Some have borrowed the tools of linguistic and symbolic analysis from the humanities.

See, e.g., Marie Ashe, The "Bad"Mother in Law and Literature:A Problem of Representation,
43 HASTINGS L.J. 1017, 1019-29 (1992); Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 8i GEO. L.J.

2475, 2493-255 (1993); Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator,Representation as
Text: Towards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1298, 1357-83 (1992).
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social sciences. 16 Others, like L6pez, struggle to integrate theory and
practice.
This Review cannot hope to provide a full account of Lopez's
attempted integration. The richness of his exposition, its narrative
intricacy and sweep, defy summary treatment. Accordingly, I pursue
a less tailored, thematic analysis that nevertheless ties Rebellious Lawyering to progressive legal scholarship, a tradition both reinvigorated
and revised by the emerging theoretics of practice movement. 17 The
focal points of this analysis are L6pez's ideas of "regnant" and "rebellious" lawyering. 8
I confront L6pez's ideas of lawyering in the same spirit that I
confront my clients in impoverished communities: I try to be open
and to connect. Like my clients, L6pez views me with skepticism. I
am his regnant archetype: the privileged, white, male, straight lawyer.
To many, including L6pez, I may be "too white, too professional, too
about to go off to some law office" to get "hooked into" the transformative, community-based work of rebellious lawyering (pp. 275, 329).
Even when I "get out" (p. 328) on the streets to learn about a community, my understanding may be too restricted by the boundaries of
race, gender, class, ethnicity, and sexual orientation. Because, as
L6pez observes, the contrast of boundaries helps define identity (p.
373), I cannot "cross over" (p. 375) to bridge the differences separating
progressive lawyers from subordinated clients and communities.
Yet, L6pez adds, I can "bear witness" (p. 275) to the harm visited
upon clients and communities and, moreover, "pitch in" (p. 287) to
help in their defense. But can I be integrated into a community when
I am the outsider, whether regnant or rebellious? Can I take a stand
with a community or fight the same fight? L6pez's answer is more
ambiguous than the response I encountered in New England fifteen
years ago. L6pez will not turn me away on race alone. At the same
time, he will not hold out the promise of redeeming community.
Instead, he looks to see if I care, if I do good work, if I am willing
to reach across boundaries. Only then will he admit the possibility
that progressive lawyers and subordinated clients may redeem momentarily a sense of shared community lost to them.

16 Many have employed the social sciences to study the operation of sociolegal relations and
institutions. See, e.g., William L.F. FeIstiner & Austin Sarat, Enactments of Power: Negotiating
Reality and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1454-58
(1992); Paul R. Tremblay, Toward a Community-Based Ethic for Legal Services Practice, 37
UCLA L. REv. iio, i1O4-29 (iggo).
17See Conference, Theoretics of Practice:The Integration of ProgressiveThought and Action,
43 HASTINGS L.J. 717 (1992).
Is Danny Greenberg questions the practical utility of the regnant/rebellious lawyering dichotomy and notes the importance of "synthesizing" lawyering tasks. See Daniel L. Greenberg,
Gerald L6pez's Rebellious Lawyering, 2 RECONSTRUCTION x16, 119 (x993).
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REGNANT LAWYERING

L6pez begins Rebellious Lawyering by challenging the progressive
tradition of regnant lawyering. The roots of this challenge are visceral. L6pez grew up in East Los Angeles, "then the Chicano part of
Los Angeles," he notes (p. i). During the 196os, L6pez recalls, East
L.A. was the landing site for the "first wave of self-consciously progressive lawyers" (p. i). These lawyers were "outsiders - white and
male" (p. i). To L6pez, "they all appeared to dress, speak, and act
alike - or at least to dress, speak, and act not at all like us" (p. i).
The avowed purpose of this "cadre of new lawyers" was to fight the
good fight (p. i). Fighting the good fight, L6pez adds, meant fighting
"our fights" (p. i).
L6pez's impression of these early progressives is "mixed at best"
(p. 2). Although he praises their intentions and dedication, he finds
their ideas of law practice and professionalism striking in their coincidence with the subordinating assumptions of "traditional legal and
popular cultures" (p. 2). These same assumptions, L6pez observes,
"long had kept Latinos, among others, at the margins and on the
bottom" (p. 2). In this way, the reproduction of prevailing legal
culture in progressive practice reinforced the conditions of subordination the activist lawyers originally intended to change (p. 2).
L6pez's disapproval of progressive law practice goes beyond historical grievances concerning the treatment of the Chicano community
in East L.A. (p. 3). His indictment of progressive practice faults the
short-sightedness, moral lassitude, and hypocrisy of lawyers. Progressives, he complains, fail to understand "the relationship between
what they do and what they hopeD to change" (p. 5). Moreover, they
seem unperturbed by their ignorance and stubbornly unwilling to
learn.
In mounting such a sharp attack, L6pez seeks not only to explore
the problems of progressive law practice, but also to reform the ideas
and methods animating that practice (pp. 5-io). L6pez calls the
conventional vision of progressive lawyering "the regnant idea of practice" (p. 23). The regnant idea, he explains, "defines a lawyer's connection to her job, to what she knows, to those who work with and
around her, to the institutions in which she functions, and to the
society she desires to change" (p. 23). In this sense, the idea both
"surrounds" and "dwells within" progressive lawyers (p. 23).
L6pez describes the idea of regnant lawyering in terms that echo
the critique of conventional lawyering tendered by other theoretics of
practice scholars. According to this critique, lawyers are self-styled
"political heroes" (p. 24). They are the "preeminent problem-solvers,"
rushing to cure situations of injustice, even though they know little
about the cultural, political, and socioeconomic structures of subordination and "try little to learn whether and how formal changes in
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law penetrate the lives of subordinated people" (p. 24). The few who
overcome subordination, struggle to pursue professional education and
training, and return to impoverished communities often adopt the
teaching of their own education and training that subordination is
natural and necessary.
L6pez maintains that ignorance of subordination and subordinated
people causes regnant lawyers to "suspect" that subordination is culturally embedded (p. 24). This suspicion rationalizes client helplessness and attributes individual dependency to a culture of poverty.
Regnant lawyers blame client dependency on society, not moral character. But this "enlightened" reassignment of blame, I submit, is
merely rhetorical. The results of social and moral construction are
the same. Both authorize lawyers to "assume leadership in pro-active
campaigns" that relegate clients to roles of passivity and obedience
(p. 24).

L6pez hears the heroic campaigns of progressive lawyers trumpeted
in the formal discourse of litigation, either narrowly asserted in providing direct service or broadly stated in devising law reform. Progressive lawyers claim the authority to command this discourse, "to
make statements through their (more than their clients') cases about
society's injustices" (p. 24). Consistent with the maxim of lawyer
heroism, clients are only nominally involved in this discourse.
Progressive lawyers similarly marginalize subordinated communities, according to L6pez. When lawyer-community connections occur,
they merely exploit institutions or groups to serve the imperatives of
litigation (pp. 3, 24). This misplaced focus discourages community
and diminishes the value of education and organization. L6pez decries
the activist tendency to see community education as a form of "diffuse,
marginal, and uncritical work" (p. 24), rather than as a coordinated
and collaborative form of critical pedagogy (pp. 275-329). Likewise,
he assails the tendency to construe organizing "as a catchword for
sporadic, supplemental mobilization" (p. 24), instead of as a sustained
and principal method of grassroots coalition-building (pp. 331-79).
Although he is critical of "orthodox organizing" methods (p. 353), he
approves of the strategic meshing of collective mobilization with individual problem-solving (p. 329).
L6pez illustrates his critique of regnant lawyering by closely analyzing the legal practice of a number of fictional characters. He
deploys narrative and story to describe the daily labor of practice.
Among the characters he portrays are Teresa, the Director of Advocates for Justice, a public interest "impact" litigation firm; Abe, an
"old left" lawyer in a small, union-side labor firm; and Jonathan, a
legal aid housing lawyer (pp. 13-23). L6pez first describes the physical

work performed by these lawyers. Next, he interrogates the epistemic
and interpretive assumptions of that work. In all three cases, he finds
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clients and whole communities repeatedly subordinated and erased in
advocacy. 19

Teresa's clients, for example, "nearly vanish[]" in her pursuit of
"large-scale, media-covered litigation" (p. 16). Teresa justifies her
exclusion of clients from the litigation process as necessary, citing her
lack of time and resources, the inadequacy of client expertise, and the
"broad social purposes" of test case litigation (p. 15).
Abe, by comparison, "regularly" does "almost exactly" what his
client - local labor union leadership - wants (p. I8). He defines
the interest of his client, however, to exclude the protests of rankand-file union members concerning workplace health and safety, factory production demands, and child-rearing (pp. 18-19). Abe defends
his firm's neglect of such "non-legal problems" on the basis of firm
economics and labor movement politics (p. 19).
Jonathan, like Teresa, excludes his clients from advocacy. Because
of time constraints, he litigates housing cases "independently" of
clients, colleagues, and geographic communities (pp. 21-22). Partly
due to "his own low opinion about the good sense or intelligence of
some of his clients" (p. 2i), Jonathan subordinates clients, in effect
treating them "like 8 year olds" (p. 22). This treatment, he concedes,
excludes clients from participating in fact investigation, negotiation,
and litigation strategy (pp. 21-22). When client participation is unavoidable (for example, at eviction hearings) he directs the client to
sit "quietly" and to produce information and documents "on cue"
(p. 22).

Despite his critical characterizations, L6pez recognizes that Teresa,
Abe, and Jonathan stand out among progressive lawyers. They are
committed, hard working, and highly competent. 20 Yet they practice
in a sociolegal culture suffused with the regnant idea of lawyering.
To law students and young lawyers, that idea is "natural"; its adoption
normal (p. 25).21 Subordinated people glean the regnant idea not only

19 L6pez shows that the regnant lawyer's obliteration of the client as an autonomous agent
may occur early in the lawyer-client relationship. He detects this obliteration in the technicianoriented actions of Community Law Office (CLO) lawyer Cecilia Bosworth ("Boz") (pp. io216). Clients, L6pez says, "turn over their 'legal' cases to her. And that's exactly what Boz wants"

(p. io9). Indeed, "she leads clients to feel entirely dependent on her" (p. iio).
20 To his credit, L6pez points out that some progressive lawyers betray their commitments
because of indolence and incompetence. The example he cites is CLO lawyer Charles Shaw (pp.
116-33). Shaw is domineering and insensitive toward clients (pp. 1x7-26). He is sloppy and
unreliable in his note-taking, file-keeping, and written work (pp. 126-32). He also is inconsistent
and irresponsible in organizing community outreach (pp. 132-33).

21 L6pez elucidates the institutional sway of regnant lawyering over individual lawyers in
his portrayal of Catherine, a law student (pp. 11-82), Helen Padilla, a young lawyer at a nonprofit law office (pp. 133-65), and Martha Fisher, a young lawyer at a small for-profit law firm
(pp. 167-273). Because of her institutional detachment, Catherine seems least affected by the
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from "street life and popular culture" (p. 25), but also from "professionals" (social workers) and "lay people" (receptionists) involved in
advocacy support activities (p. 26).
Widespread acceptance of the regnant idea among lawyers, clients,
and affiliated professionals valorizes certain kinds of "knowledge" and
"work" (p. 26). What "counts," L6pez asserts, is understanding "how
things work and how to get things done" (p. 26). Acquiring this
understanding confers "wisdom" and "status" (p. 26) both on professionals and on lay people (p. 27). For this reason, challenging the
regnant idea is controversial. At stake is the authority to know, to
interpret, and to speak the truth about the sociolegal world. It is the
courage to contest and to reimagine the truth that drives L6pez to
transform the idea of regnant lawyering.
To L6pez, truth is neither universal nor given. Indeed, there is
no truth that "makes sense of everything in the world" (p. 65). Rather,
truth is contingent, negotiated, and partial. It arises out of collaboration between lawyers and clients working jointly as co-eminent
practitioners in local contexts (p. 29). Lawyers seeking this provisional
truth recognize the value of a client's practical knowledge - the
"know-how inevitably at work in each and every person's effort to
get by day to day" (p. 29). They also realize that such knowledge
may lie "outside" their professional "understanding of the social world"
(p. 29). Nonetheless, they strive to learn about alternative worlds and
ways of knowing and thus renounce the regnant privilege to proclaim
absolute truth. For L6pez, this renunciation is the well-spring of
rebellious lawyering.
II. REBELLIOUS LAWYERING
L6pez calls his aspirational vision of practice "rebellious lawyering." Both the "look" and "feel" of this practice are "different" (p. 30).
The difference, experienced equally by lawyers, clients, and communities, turns on process as well as result. To illuminate that difference,
L6pez considers two additional characters: Sophie and Amos. Sophie
is a neighborhood legal aid lawyer specializing in immigration (p. 30).
Amos is the coordinator of a new, local, non-profit organization concentrating on the needs of families and children (p. 34).

pull of regnant practice. Padilla, though a "remarkable talent," is susceptible to the pressure of
"formulaic" practice (p. I44) and to the enmity of colleagues uncommitted to community education and outreach activities (pp. 147-62). Fisher is perhaps the most vulnerable of the group to
the allure of "professional expertise" (p. 19o). Overwhelmed by the complexities and the urgent
circumstances of civil rights litigation, she surrenders her vision of lawyer-client collaboration
(p. 231) for the conventional role of an "expert," sometimes autocratic, "technician" (p. 232).
That surrender precludes her engagement with clients as "co-eminent problem-solvers" (p. 2 13).
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Sophie lives and works in a small, low-income community "largely
of color" (p. 31). She is an active member of the local tenants' group
(P. 31). Her son attends the local elementary school (p. 31). Consistent with her community activism, Sophie "systematically tries to
encourage local people to share experiences and to develop the knowhow that will enable them to better anticipate and address their needs
over time" (p. 32). This encouragement occurs in conjunction with
conventional litigation strategies (pp. 32-33). The integration of litigation and community organizing strategies, 22 Sophie finds, increases
client participation in the lawyering process. L6pez terms Sophie's
integrated grassroots advocacy and organizing scheme "communitybased lawyering" (p. 33).
Amos is an "old home boy" (p. 37). He grew up locally but left
for college and, subsequently, for seventeen years of work as a teacher,
youth counselor, Head Start director, and public defender in juvenile
court (p. 35). Upon his return, Amos joined the family-law unit of a
legal services office, where he worked for eleven years learning firsthand about the problems of organization and cooperation that slow
the allocation of resources and provision of assistance to families and
children (pp. 34-35).
For L6pez, Sophie and Amos embody "the rebellious idea of lawyering against subordination" (p. 37). The crux of this idea is collaboration: "lawyers must know how to work with (not just on behalf
of) women, low-income people, people of color, gays and lesbians,
the disabled, and the elderly" (p. 37, emphasis added). Collaboration
extends to "professional and lay allies" and thus entails a willingness
to educate others and an openness to "being educated" by others
(P. 37), however marginal they appear.
In L6pez's vision, to "lawyer rebelliously" is to "ground [advocacy]
in the lives and in the communities of the subordinated themselves"
(p. 38). This grounding requires advocates to connect legal and "nonlegal" problem-solving approaches (p. 38), to collaborate with others
in strategic planning, to remedy particular and general manifestations
of "social and political subordination," to build and join coalitions,
and to appreciate the regional, national, and international dimensions
of "local affairs" (p. 38). To satisfy these requirements, L6pez urges
the development of "sensibilities and skills" tailored to the "collective
fight for social change" (p. 38).
The sensibilities and skills of L6pez's rebellious lawyering constitute a full-blown theoretics of progressive law practice. Although
L6pez and theoretics of practice scholars differ in their descriptive
22Sophie's community strategies include organizing support groups, planning lay-directed
rights education workshops, and arranging grotp cooperatives (pp. 31-32).
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and prescriptive analyses, their critiques share a common focus on
lawyers' epistemic stances. Lawyers' ways of knowing extend to "law
in books" as well as "law in action. '23 Judgments regarding the
delivery of and strategy for legal services under conditions of scarcity
require predictions about both forms of law. Predictions that rely on
claims of neutrality and objectivity or on claims of purposivism and
practicality hide the moral and political content of lawyer discretionary
judgments. 24 Both sets of claims provide support, albeit unsatisfactory, for lawyers' exercise of moral and political discretion in making
judgments about the delivery of legal services, judgments deemed selfevident to those endowed with legal knowledge.
L6pez treats legal knowledge as merely "one practical knowledge
among other practical knowledges" (p. 38). This even-handed treatment reduces the "estrangement between lay and legal cultures" (p. 47)
and prompts the recognition that clients, like lawyers, possess "special
practical know-how" about "how things work and get done" (p. 50).
For L6pez, the knowledge possessed by lawyers, other professionals,
lay advocates, and clients consists of "a set of stock stories and storytelling techniques" (p. 40). Because these problem-solving techniques are widely used, lawyers are "not necessarily better able" than
clients or other activists to serve as legal representatives (pp. 55-56).
And yet progressive lawyers proclaim their superior problem-solving ability and defend their sole management of the advocacy process.
This stance is rooted in the interpretive authority of lawyers. The
interpretive, identity-making acts of lawyers are based on a pre-understanding of dependency that operates to marginalize, subordinate,
and discipline clients. 25 The traditional strategies of progressive legal
advocacy - direct service and law reform - reinforce that preunderstanding by circulating myths of inherent client passivity. In
oral and written advocacy, it is the lawyer's construction of a client's
2 6
identity, of her story, and finally, of the law that predominates.
Justifications for this interpretive dominance assume an immutable
and unyielding sociolegal order in which institutional constraints (office caseloads and court dockets) compel clients to yield full authority
to their lawyers. This assumption overlooks the variable and openended quality of such constraints, and, equally important, the ten-

23 The distinction belongs to Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L.
REV. 12 passim (xgio).

24 This contention is part of a broader argument I make elsewhere. See Anthony V. Alfieri,
Impoverished Practices, 8x GEO. L.J. 2567, 2590-2660 (993).
25 For an elaboration of the concept of pre-understanding, see Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, xoo YALE L.J. 2107,
2123-25 (I99I).

26 On reigning constructions of client identity in the lawyering process, see Ann Shalleck,
Constructions of the Client Within Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REv. 173!, 1733-39 (x993).
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dency of lawyers to exert excess authority regardless of such constraints. Lawyers' exertion of what they perceive to be necessary
authority subordinates clients by erasing their
identities, silencing their
27
narratives, and suppressing their histories.
L6pez attributes the claim of interpretive and managerial privilege
to legal education and to the social constructions of lawyers. In their
relationships with clients, lawyers construct identity from difference:
age, class, disability, ethnicity, gender, race, and sexual orientation.
Difference suggests inferior ability and weak character. According to
this logic, the older black man and woman I encountered must be
judged incompetent to apply problem-solving and managerial skills
adequate to their own representation.
Recasting the meaning of client identity, difference, and competence requires lawyers to experiment with "different cultural interpretations" of the same individual or collective experience (p. 44). Part
of that experiment entails addressing client subjectivity. Contrary to
the conventional myth of dependency, 28 a poor client is an autonomous
subject capable of both accommodating and resisting the commands
of sociolegal actors: lawyers, caseworkers, judges. 2 9 Accommodation
and resistance are often intertwined in the same act. A client, for
example, may agree to abide by lawyer-scripted trial testimony, yet
deliberately break from that script for normative or strategic reasons.
In the shadow of this ambiguity, an individual client's voice multiplies,
her narratives compete, and her stories conflict.
The multiplicity of client voice, narrative, and story demands the
practice of "bicultural and bilingual" translation (p. 44). This method
of translation, L6pez explains, moves "in two directions, creating both
a meaning for the legal culture out of the situations that people are
living and a meaning for people's practices out of the legal culture"
(P. 43). Meaning derives from understanding "the client's experience
of the situation" given her own "categories and characterizations" of
daily living (p. 6o). For L6pez, getting a "feel" for the client's situation
-

what she "thinks, feels, needs, and desires" -

is pivotal (p. 6i).

By getting the feel of a "client's social (not just legal) situation" (p.
38), lawyers may be able to acquire fluency in discourses of difference
and to construct client identity in terms of problem-solving and managerial competence.
27 On necessity and excess in lawyer interpretive strategies, see Anthony V. Alfieri, The
Ethics of Violence: Necessity, Excess, and Opposition, 94 COLUM. L. REv. (forthcoming 1994)
(reviewing AUSTIN SARAT & THOMAS KEARNS, LAW'S VIOLENCE (1992)).
28 See Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, A Genealogy of Dependency: Tracing a Keyword of
the U.S. Welfare State, Ig SIGNS 309 passim (i994).

29 See Alfieri, supra note 25, at 2114-18 (depicting a food stamp recipient asserting the norms
of dignity, caring, community, and rights); Anthony V. Alfieri, Speaking Out of Turn: The Story
of Josephine V., 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 61g, 633-43 (1991) (describing an AFDC mother
resisting lawyer storytelling in order to speak out in her own defense).
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L6pez hears talk of client competence and incompetence echoing
throughout law and lawyering. He defines law as "a set of stories
and storytelling practices that describe and prescribe social reality and
a set of conventions for defining and resolving disputes" (p. 43).
Lawyers employ a variety of discourses that describe law (constitutions, statutes, regulations, and judge-made decisions), legal institutions (courts and bureaucracies), and sociolegal relations (lawyerclient, lawyer-state, and client-state). In private offices, the discourses
emerge in interviewing, counseling, and negotiation. At trials, they
appear in opening and closing statements, direct and cross examinations, and evidentiary objections. On appeal, they come out in oral
argument. At public hearings and community education forums, they
unfold in testimony and in lectures. Lawyers recast their oral pronouncements in written forms: letters, memoranda, briefs, and press
releases. Both oral and written pronouncements constitute stories.
Shaped by law and institutional need, the stories make claims about
the world subordinated people inhabit, its truths and necessities.
To L6pez, everyone possesses lawyering and storytelling skills (p.
39) that can alter social arrangements and remedy disputes (p. 41). It
is the job of lawyers to recognize how often subordinated people
deploy "story/argument strategies" to contest institutionally assigned
roles and relations of dependency (p. 49). Once lawyers realize the
force and regularity of that deployment, L6pez asserts, they must help
clients understand how to transfer their everyday living skills to legal
advocacy (p. 40).

The socially constructed reality of client dependency and incompetence shifts with the content of lawyer stories. According to L6pez,
lawyer "stock and improvised" stories and arguments can "help establish meaning and distribute power" (p. 43). Consequently, storytelling
has the potential to transform the meaning of client difference and
identity, and to reallocate lawyer-client power to manage the advocacy
process.
L6pez challenges the regnant story glorifying lawyer preeminence
and power (p. 6i). The differences in lawyer-client authority flowing
from that stock story, he warns, "disfigure" individuals (p. 43) and
"distort" social arrangements (p. 59). To realign lawyer-client authority, L6pez recommends reversing the "marginalization" of clients' "local knowledge" (p. 51). Reversal hinges on believing clients to be
"capable" moral agents equipped "with a will to fight, and with considerable experience in resisting and occasionally reversing subordinated status" (p. 5o). Treating clients as capable fighters in the struggle against subordination affirms a practical expertise that
complements lawyers' knowledge (p. 5o). The inability of lawyers and
clients to uncover this complementary potential is in part a function
of unequal institutional roles and relations.
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Within legal institutional contexts, the imperatives of administration and adjudication dictate conventional roles and relations of practice. For advocates in civil rights and poverty law contexts, the
received tradition of practice constructs clients as victims. 30 This
31
construction reduces clients to powerless and pathological objects.
L6pez links client objectification to the tendency of legal institutions to be "hostile" to and "often systematically ignorant" of client
needs (p. 47). The institutions pass on "structural constraints" (p. 68)
and engender "specific adaptations" (p. 68). Implanted within these
social constraints and adaptive strategies are "practical moments" of
rebellion (p. 62). Although "unpredictable" (p. 68), those moments
provide the "central opportunities" for rebellious lawyering (p. 64).32
L6pez contends that lawyers and clients can transform routine acts
into opportunities for collaborative problem-solving in which skills are
combined and power is shared (p. 74). In advocacy, collaboration
may generate lawyer-client, client-client, and client-community alliances. Collaboration is an empowerment or enabling strategy that
redefines traditional lawyer-client roles, reorganizes divisions of legal
and nonlegal labor, and reallocates the authority to designate and to
33
execute advocacy tasks.
L6pez imagines collaboration as an experimental and "constantly
reevaluat[ed]" process involving lawyers, clients, and lay advocates
(P. 48). Because that process "can relocate and blur the lines between
self-help, lay lawyering, and professional lawyering" (p. 79), internal
30 For exposition of victimization strategies in anti-discrimination and disability law, see
KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VICTIMS
98-io8 (1988), and Alfieri, cited above in note 14, at 811-28.
31 In hostile or abusive work environment cases brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act, for example, advocates traditionally proffer evidence of concrete harm or injury to a
plaintiff's psychological well-being. Recently, in Harris v. Forklift Systems, 114 S. Ct. 367
(1993), the Supreme Court rejected an evidentiary requirement of "concrete psychological harm"

in such cases, but noted that evidence of harm "may be taken into account." Id. at 371. The
Court stated that the employee's psychological well-being is "relevant to determining whether

[she] actually found the environment abusive." Id. Accordingly, advocates are unlikely to stop
producing evidence of a plaintiff's tangible psychological injury.
32 L6pez concedes that practical moments of rebellion may go unnoticed. Because such
moments are by definition routine, he explains, they "arise in the course of activities that many
others treat either as trivial or mechanical to good lawyering" (p. 62). Examples of these moments
include the "ways in which a receptionist answers the phone" (p. 62), the "ways in which clients
and lawyers create and update a file" (p. 63), the "ways in which intake interviews and followup contacts get structured" (p. 63), the "way in which clients and lawyers design and carry out
fact investigations" (p. 63), and the "ways in which clients and lawyers deploy conventional
symbols of power" (p. 64).

33 See Susan Bryant & Maria Arias, Case Study: A Battered Women's Rights Clinic: Designing a Clinical Program Which Encourages a Problem-Solving Vision of Lawyering That
Empowers Clients and Community, 42 J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 207, 220 (1992) (encouraging
clinical law students to allow clients "to participate in defining what a lawyer's role should be").

1762

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 107:3747

tensions may ensue (p. 45). Mitigating those tensions demands "forgiveness and patience" (p. 45), as well as a sense of the "practical and
moral limits" of the process itself (p. 52). This sense of limits intrudes
upon L6pez's vision of rebellious lawyering, reminding us that lawyers
and clients "remain divided" (p. 51) in spite of good faith efforts at
collaboration.
L6pez views lawyer-client collaborative problem-solving as part of
a gradual, integrated move into "a larger network of cooperating
problem-solvers" (p. 55). This network avoids the professional and
political "separatism" that plagues progressive lawyering (p. 55), and
thereb , allows practitioners to pursue "collective" problem-solving
through the teaching of "self-help and lay lawyering" skills (p. 70).
Teaching self-help and lay lawyering, L6pez concludes, enables "public institutions and professional service providers [to] help people help
themselves" (p. 73).

I. BRIDGES
Bridging the ideas of regnant and rebellious lawyering demands a
strategy of reform. For L6pez, the core of this strategy resides in the
"familiar practices" (p. 74) of daily lawyering, for it is the "small,
everyday details" (p. 382) of practice that offer the greatest chance of
reorienting the traditional sensibilities 3 4 and skills of advocacy. L6pez
belongs to a community of lawyers, scholars, and teachers embroiled
in debate over the best methods of bridging theory and practice to
reform progressive lawyering. 35 Unlike critical scholars of the last
two decades, 3 6 the theoretics of practice community espouses an explicitly normative goal: to foster individual and collective client acts
of self-determination in order to broaden social and economic forms
of democracy. To reach this goal, L6pez and others have disassembled

34 L6pez does not explicitly suggest ways to change regnant lawyer sensibilities, but Amos's
story is instructive in this regard:
[Bleing a person of color and an old home boy doesn't automatically make you an
insider, especially if you're a lawyer. Expectations differ, and trust is sometimes hard to
reestablish. Only time and shared experiences, he keeps telling Catherine, will renegotiate
the terms of his relationship with those in the East Bay and ultimately help him integrate
his status and his know-how (p. 37).
3S Different members of the progressive community find alternate causes for this turmoil.
See Paul Tremblay, A Tragic View of Poverty Law Practice, I D.C. L. REV. 123 (1992) (citing
bureaucratic constraints); Lucie E. White, Paradox, Piece-work, and Patience, 43 HASTINGS
L.J. 853, 857-59 (1992) (noting the dangers to poor people posed by theorizing the practice of
poverty law).
36 See Richard M. Fischl, The Question That Killed CriticalLegal Studies, x7 LAW & Soc.
INQUIRY 779, 785-800 (1992) (rebuffing the call to cls by its critics to enunciate a normative
vision of social change).
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the lawyering process, 3 7 challenging not only lawyers' epistemologi-

cal, 38 interpretive, 39 and linguistic 40 practices, but also their basic

41
education and training.

The teachings of legal education and training, amplified by the
imperatives of law and legal institutions, compel progressive lawyers
to adopt a heroic stance toward communities that condemns them as
outsiders. The centrality of lawyer heroism in the progressive canon
inhibits experimental forms of lawyer-client collaboration and, thus,
frustrates the realization of lawyer-client community. Under the progressive canon, neither lawyers nor subordinated people hold out
claims to community. The absence of such claims stems from lawyers'
lack of connection to client identities, narratives, and histories. To
make these human connections, lawyers must relearn their habits of
42
knowing, thinking, and speaking.
Lawyers must relearn their own convictions. We must learn that
our professional autonomy is linked to the autonomy of others and
37 To be useful, studies of civil rights and poverty law advocacy must focus on the interactions among lawyers, clients, laws, and institutions. The complex dynamics of these interactions
blur such efforts, especially if they consider the backdrop of cultural, economic, political, and
social movements, and the indeterminate categories of age, class, disability, ethnicity, gender,
race, and sexual orientation. The multiplicity of factors animating the lawyering process and
the shifting sociolegal currents buffeting that process complicate any attempt to derive general
axioms of practice, whether descriptive or prescriptive. Caution counsels the tentative formulation, provisional dissemination, and continuous revision of hypotheses and remedies.
38 See Gerald P. L6pez, The Work We Know So Little About, 42 STAN. L. REv. I, iO (1989)
(noting lawyer misunderstanding of the "formal insurrection" signified in legal claims pressed by
low-income women of color).
39 See Gerald P. L6pez, A Declaration of War by Other Means, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1667,
1670 (1985) (remarking on lawyers' use of "stock stories" to understand and navigate the world
and reviewing RICHARD E. MORGAN, DISABLING AMERICA: THE "RIGHTS INDUSTRY" IN OUR
TIM~sE (1984)); Gerald P. L6pez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REv. i, 5-6 (1984) (discussing the
importance of "stock stories" as an "interpretive network").
40 See Gerald P. L6pez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life of a
Rebellious Collaboration, 77 GEO. L.J. 1603 passim (1989) (studying rights discourse in public
interest counseling and litigation); Gerald P. L6pez, Economic Development in the "Murder
Capital of the Nation," 6o TENN L. REv. 685 passim (1993) (examining the meaning of community and collective self-determination in the discourse of economic development law and
lawyers).
41 See Gerald P. L6pez, Training Future Lawyers to Work with the Politically and Socially
Subordinated:Anti-Generic Legal Education, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 305, 307 (1989) (assailing legal
education for "its restricted models of teaching and learning, its disdain for lawyering and for
training in all but a relatively small number of skills, its neglect of interdisciplinary theoretical
ideas, its disregard of everyday life, and its lack of coordination").
42 L6pez acknowledges that "countering" lawyer privilege, power, and knowledge "is no easy
task and no permanent achievement" (p. 53). Legal education can and must contribute to this
task. See, e.g., Barbara Bezdek, Reconstructing a Pedagogy of Responsibility, 43 HASTINGS
L.J. 1159 passim (1992); Gary L. Blasi, The "Homeless Seminar" at UCLA, 42 WASH. U. J.
URB. & CONTEmp. L. 85 passim (1992); Bill Ong Hing, Raising Personal Identification Issues
of Class, Race, Ethnicity, Gender, Sexual Orientation,Physical Disability, and Age in Lawyering
Courses, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1807 passim (1993).
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that our claims of neutrality are false. We must learn that our cognitive judgment is impaired, not objective, and that our practical
reasoning ignores alternative sources of knowledge. We must learn
that our ability to empathize with clients and to translate clients'
stories into legal discourse is limited by hierarchy.
Furthermore, lawyers must relearn the sociolegal world. We must
learn that a client's speech acts - whether in the form of uncomfortable answers to interview questions, vague assent to counseling options, or rambling testimony at trial - are rhetorical strategies of
accommodation and resistance that enable her to maneuver within
relationships and institutions under the cover of ambiguous and sometimes inconsistent stories. We must learn to enlarge the discourses of
law and legal institutions to fit, rather than silence, these stories. And
we must learn to redefine institutional roles and relations to permit
clients and communities to collaborate in telling their stories, even if
the bridges of collaboration are makeshift and short-lived.
To be sure, the critical evaluation of our convictions and our
mapping of the sociolegal world is unlikely to bridge fully the practices
of regnant and rebellious lawyering. The legal consciousness and
sociolegal practices of regnant lawyering are historically entrenched in
law schools, law offices, courts, and the streets. Neither passionate
nor persuasive entreaties will overturn them, but instead only the dayto-day struggle of people who suffer their indignities, allied with those
who find such suffering intolerable.
CONCLUSION

L6pez inspires those who labor on behalf of subordinated communities to rethink their efforts. Rethinking begins in remembrance
- for me, the remembrance of chance meetings outside an old New
England church and inside an airless, New York City storefront.
Some say that to look for the loss or redemption of community in
these meetings is misguided. To look for some meaning, for some
lesson to be learned, is not.
What is the lesson here? The lesson is that lawyers working for
or with subordinated people in impoverished communities need to
learn where they stand. This means learning from the people who
live in those communities; it means learning that lawyers stand divided from the communities they represent. The man in New England and the woman in New York City taught me where to stand
when confronted by divisions of class, gender and race. Although our
meetings hardly mark the deliverance of redemptive community, neither do they signal the hopeless resignation to loss.

